ISSN 2756-3405
African Journal of Philosophy and Religious Studies ISSN 1621-4587 Vol. 4 (5), pp. 001-007, May, 2018. © International Scholars Journals
Review
A Cartesian critique of the artificial intelligence
Rajakishore Nath
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai-76, Indian. E-mail: [email protected].
Accepted 26 January, 2018
Abstract
This paper deals with the philosophical problems concerned with research in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), in particular with problems arising out of claims that AI exhibits ‘consciousness’, ‘thinking’ and other ‘inner’ processes and that they simulate human intelligence and cognitive processes in general. The argument is to show how Cartesian mind is non-mechanical. Descartes’ concept of ‘I think’ presupposes subjective experience, because it is ‘I’ who experiences the world. Likewise, Descartes’ notion of ‘I’ negates the notion of computationality of the mind. The essence of mind is thought and the acts of thoughts are identified with the acts of consciousness. Therefore, it follows that cognitive acts are conscious acts, but not computational acts. Thus, for Descartes, one of the most important aspects of cognitive states and processes is their phenomenality, because our judgments, understanding, etc. can be defined and explained only in relation to consciousness and not in relation to computationality. We can only find computationality in machines and not in the mind, which wills, understands and judges.
Key words: Cartesian mind, artificial intelligence, physical symbols, non-mechanical mind, thought, intelligence, cognitive, intentionality, subjectivity.