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Ripe without warning: Israel and Egypt 1967-1973

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Ripeness is a situation in which conflicting parties are prepared for peacemaking. Ripeness theory, as applied to international relations, however, tends to be tautological. For Israel and Egypt, the early 1970s were a turbulent period of international relations. The decisions of these two nations, specifically the decisions to go to war, were unexpected and unexplainable given current models of rational choice. Using recently unclassified State Department manuscripts documenting telegram and telephone conversations between US government officials and those of Israel and Egypt, a more accurate explanatory model for decision making is considered. Combining international norm and prospect theory models create a framing device that can better explain the reference point from which decisions were made by the Egyptian and Israeli states during the early 1970s. A better understanding of these decision making processes could potentially lead to an improved method of predicting and recognizing situations of ripeness in international relations.

Key words: Decision-making, ripeness theory, prospect theory, October war, Ramadan war, orientalism, deterrence.

INTRODUCTION

Ripeness is a situation in which conflicting parties are prepared for peace making. Identifying this period of "ripeness" is the first step to successful peace negotiations. Ripeness theory lacks complete predictive characteristics because of the insufficient understanding of the decision-making processes within theories of international relations. An increased understanding of international decision-making processes would lend itself to a more functional version of ripeness theory.

Individuals and groups are constantly faced with decisions. Every decision holds some level of risk. Rational choice theories tell us that when faced with risk, decision makers weigh the expected values and probabilities of possible outcomes and subsequently choose the option with the highest value. However, experimental results prove that under certain "risky" circumstances decision makers do not choose the option offering the highest expected value. Decisions are made from a certain reference point and it is from this reference point that risk propensity is determined. This reference point varies depending on the situation thus making generalizations about risk propensities highly subjective.

For Israel and Egypt, the period following the June 1967 War was a turbulent period of international relations. During this time both Israel and Egypt were con-

stantly faced with "risky" decisions while at the brink of war. The decisions made by these two states, specifically the decisions to go to war, were sometimes unexpected and unexplainable given current models of rational choice. The October 1973 war caught most of the world by surprise, it did not fit anyone's preconceptions of how a war in the Middle East was likely to develop (Quandt, 1977). In examining the decision-making processes within Egypt and Israel during the early 1970's I will consider a more accurate explanatory model for decision-making.

As a framework for explaining decisions under uncertainty "prospect theory" has much to offer a myriad of academic disciplines. Prospect theory addresses the holes and inconsistencies of rational choice theory. Even if rational choice models can claim robust predictive power, prospect theory can match that power and add both descriptive accuracy and explanatory insight into the equation as well (McDermott, 1998). Prospect theory consists of two phases. In the initial "editing phase" the decision maker identifies a reference point, the available options, and the value of each option (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Following the "editing phase" is the "evaluation phase". During the "evaluation phase" the decision maker multiplies each outcome by its respective decision weight (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Within

simple controlled laboratory experiments prospect theory is able to explain and predict individual behavior under risky circumstances (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The problem is that the corresponding decision weight is dependant upon many factors both observable and unobservable.

Cross application of prospect theory to state level decision-making diminishes much of the predictive power while presenting new factors not applicable to decision-making at the individual level. Prospect theory is based on a psychological approach to individual level decision-making processes assuming that individuals, governments and decision-making entities operate in a similar fashion. The translation of experimental results from the laboratory setting to the real world presents new uncontrolled variables. One such variable is the potential overlap effect of multiple reference framing devices. It is impossible to isolate individual variables in real world situations thus making any causal link very difficult to establish. Every scenario of international relations is based on different decision framing devices and weighted payoffs all with different perceived probabilities. In real world decision-making specifically in the collective decision-making processes at the international level there are many exogenous variables making it difficult claim predictive accuracy within such a model.

Prospect theory can both explain and predict risk propensity in the international environment (McDermott, 1998). This is true if you can accurately estimate the level of reference dependence within the "editing phase" of the decision-making process (McDermott, 1998). However, accuracy of such an estimate is implausible when considering decision-making at the international level. At the same time, even by understanding just a piece of the decision-making process conflict mediators and great powers can best approach the negotiation process and potentially take advantage of or bring attention to a potential period of ripeness.

The "editing phase" is what complicates the validity of prospect theory as applied to nation-state decision-making. The reference defining stage within the "editing phase" of prospect theory is known as "framing". The framing of the reference point is inherent in the way the analyst sets up the choice problem (Levy, 1997). Framing of the reference point among individuals is generally guided by the status quo, expectations, aspirations, social norms and social comparisons (Levy, 1997). Reference defining variables affecting individuals are different from those influencing states. When applying prospect theory to the field of international relations we must reconsider the reference defining processes undertaken by collective decision makers. In its current state, prospect theory as applied to international relations is a reference dependant theory without a theory of reference (Levy, 1997). Without a solid reference theory from which to base risk propensity, any application of prospect theory

to international relations would be subjective and inaccurate. The problem with applying prospect theory to situations of international relations is that probabilities and utilities of outcomes are only as good as the judgments and values of political leaders about which we often have little or biased information (Levy, 1997). It is my objective to explore a more accurate theory of reference from which prospect theory may be applied to international relations, specifically to the case of the decision of Egypt to attack Israel in October of 1973.

I will define the reference point through an analysis of the language in US Government documents summarizing relevant events of the period and involving critical actors in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This method of analysis could be significantly biased given the close relationship between Israel and the United States during this time period and the "game playing" nature of international politics. I give close attention to the reliability of information used as empirics within my research. I evaluate the reliability of CIA and State Department documents based upon context and the parties involved. I give particular weight to internal messages and conversations. It is my goal to use only empirics which are objective and relatively unbiased in their language and analysis of the situation. To balance any potential biases I examine various sources and contrasting points of view.

International norms

When considering prospect theory as applied to international relations it would be irresponsible to assume a parallel decision-making processes between individuals and groups. In evaluation of collective government reference framing there are many potentially influential factors. I will argue that within prospect theory's "editing phase" framing by Egypt governed by perceived "international norms". International norms are the standard of appropriate behavior for nation-states (Finnemore, 1998). International norms encompass many different aspects of collective behavior. One of the common criticisms of norms research has been that it provides no substantive hypothesis about which norms will be influential in world politics and under what conditions they will be influential (Finnemore, 1998). Within my research I will focus on the sanctity of borders as an international norm. The sanctity of borders is particularly relevant when considering the Israeli and Egyptian conflicts of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s international norms in regards to territorial acquisition were still solidifying. However, it was generally held that territorial acquisition through an act of war was in violation of international norms. The normative acceptability of this claim can be established through an examination of the intent behind the United Nations Resolution 242 which, although failed due to imprecise syntax, was designed with

with the intent to guide the “withdraw of Israeli forces from (all) occupied territories” (United Nations Resolution 242, 1967). In 1967 The United Nations consisted of 123 member countries. Given the representative nature of the United Nations, it holds the power and responsibility to establish international norms. Thus we can conclude that in 1967 territorial acquisition violated international boundary norms.

Aftermath of the six day war

In June of 1967 Israel launched a preemptive strike against Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian forces. Following the Six Day War of 1967 Israel gained control of the Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. To Israel this victory established their military superiority in the region. This defeat initiated a new dynamic in Israeli- Arab relations (Shafir, 2006). Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan describes Israel as “less like a peaceful state and more like a stronger, more expansion minded nation” following the events of the Six Day War.¹ Within a USA Report on the Middle East two years following the Six Day War the Israeli government is described as “self-confident (to the point of arrogance were it not for a brooding sense of uncertainty) proud of their own valor and determined to exploit their present strategic advantages to the fullest in order to gain enduring security... they feel that their military success has for the first time given them a strong bargaining position”.¹ The perception of a strong bargaining position combined with a decisively superior military force led to a new overly confident Israeli position that proved to be counterproductive to the peace-making process.

The Israeli Government believed they could insure of the success of deterrence through maintaining military superiority and a boundary that best insured their national security. In October 1967 when asked about desirable borders Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan responded by stating that “the ceasefire lines are ideal borders”.² If the ceasefire lines were ideal borders and Israel expected deterrence to hold then there was no incentive for Israel to deviate from its current course of inaction. The Egyptian fear that, “an interim settlement would lead to a final demarcation line...and therefore deprive Israel of any incentive to come to an agreement”

¹File 25: Declassified USA Report and Comments on Middle East; Jun. 1, 1969; White House Central Files, Joseph Sisco Files; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.

² File 2226: Declassified Department of State Airgram, Dayan on Post-war Problems; Oct. 4, 1967; White House Central Files; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.

was very much justified.³ Israeli officials believed that deterrence would hold and that the passage of time and the failure of negotiations would further secure any gains. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir developed a standard argument against any sort of withdrawal. Meir argued that a withdrawal “would just invite more pressure on Israel to go the next step and say where it intends to withdraw to, and then if that is done Israel will be asked to pull back physically to those lines”.⁴

In considering the normative acceptability of territorial acquisition within international conflict one of the most important factors to be considered is time. As time passes the acceptability of occupation and potential annexation becomes more and more of a viable option. Stalling in the negotiation process by the Israeli government following the Six Day War further hardened any potential negotiating position.⁵ The international community was not blind to the effects of the passage of time however, did little to intervene. The US Department of State “argued undue passage of time was not helpful since it could lead to (a) discrediting of Arab moderates and (b) hardening of Israeli position.”⁶ Immediately following the 1967 War the Israeli government made a secret decision to withdraw from the occupied lands of Egypt and Syria in exchange for peace (Shafir, 2006). This plan was lost as time passed and to the Israelis the international borders blurred something different to the Israelis. The Israelis became more concerned with borders designed to ensure their national security.

The decision-making model provided by Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect theory would predict Israel to accept the status quo. In the months and years following the June 1967 Six Day War Israel was in the domain of gains. They had acquired new territory that they believed better ensured their security and they successfully demonstrated their military’s dominance. People tend to be risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in

³ File 134: Declassified Memorandum of Conversation; Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; May 29, 1969; White House Central Files, Henry A. Kissinger Files; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.

⁴ File 2384: Declassified Department of State Airgram, Domestic Israeli Debate over Foreign Policy; May 20, 1970; White House Central Files; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.

⁵ File 2224: Declassified Department of State Telegram Subject: Report on Eban Visit- Oct. 23-24; Oct. 31, 1967; White House Central Files, National Archives Building, Washington, DC.

⁶ File 2224: Declassified Department of State Telegram Subject: Report on Eban Visit- Oct. 23-24; Oct. 31, 1967; White House Central Files, National Archives Building; Washington, DC.

the domain of losses (McDermott, 1998) . Similarly, to Israel the lowest perceived risk came from acceptance of the status- quo. This was indeed their preferred position throughout the negotiation process. In a memorandum for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders states that “more than anything else is that the Israelis are convinced that preserving the status quo is the best policy because “real peace” with the Arabs is not to be had at any price”.⁷ This internal statement gives us a more reliable picture of the position of Israel following the June 1967 War. Inaction by Israel accurately reflects the status quo bias which tells us that people stay at the status quo more frequently than expected utility would predict especially under the circumstances of continued gains (Levy, 1997). Loss aversion induces a bias that favors the retention of the status quo over all other options (Kahneman and Tversky, 1991). The only scenario in which Israel would be willing to take action would be the unlikely event that the Egyptians would offer both peace and land to the Israelis. “What this boils down to is that the Israelis see less incentive today (in May 1972) to be flexible and more reason than ever to make their terms for peace more explicit and tougher”.⁸ Israel and the International community assumed that the position held by Israel both ensured deterrence and granted them a stronger bargaining position. As defined by prospect theory a decision maker operating in the realm of perceived gains has no incentive to deviate from their current course of action and will chose outcomes that offer lower levels of perceived risk (McDermott, 1998). To Israel inaction meant zero risk because they were convinced that deterrence would hold.

Territorial integrity

The importance of international boundary norms to the Egyptian government and people were underestimated by both Israeli and American leadership. Israel, the United States and the international community assumed that traditional theories of deterrence would hold thus preventing any attack by Egyptian forces. Throughout the negotiation process Egypt made it clear that it was the sanctity of Egyptian borders which governed their decision-making. Swedish Ambassador Gunnar Jarring’s states that “it (Egypt) regards the withdraw of Israeli

⁷ File 129: Declassified Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger; Israeli View on a Peace Settlement; May 16, 1972; National Security Council Institutional Files; National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

⁸ File 129: Declassified Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger; Israeli View on a Peace Settlement; May 16, 1972; National Security Council Institutional Files; National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

forces as one of the main prerequisites for a just and lasting peace. It further feels that Israel should repudiate its policy of territorial expansion.”⁹ Throughout the negotiations process “Jarring told us (Department of State) he thought Egypt would not negotiate at all until we had given them commitment on boundaries.”¹⁰ The Egyptians tried to make it clear that even if traditional deterrence theories would predict Israeli dominance, boundaries imposed by force and not through negotiations or without considerations of international boundary norms would lead to continued violence. Early on in the negotiation process Egyptian Assistant to the President of UAR for Foreign Affairs Mahmoud Fawzi stated that “the only chance for Israel and the Arabs to live together would come from moderate policies. No one will derive security from boundaries if they just create continuing resentment or if they are imposed by force”.¹¹ In an internal statement to General Amer on June 6th 1967 during the Six Day War Former Egyptian President Nasser states that “A regime which is unable to defend the borders of its homeland loses its legitimacy” (Oren, 2002). This quotation embodies the feelings of diminished legitimacy in the years following the Six Day War. It was the legitimacy of Egypt which was at stake. To the Egyptian people a government that is unable to defend its people is in fact no government at all. To the Egyptian government and people peace without land was not peace at all.

Other factors potentially operating as reference framing devices within the Egyptian decision-making process were the “concepts of “honor” and “dignity”¹². Orientalism is the theory that there is an inherently different cultural atmosphere between the East and the West (Said, 1985). The Orientalist perspective would tell us that it was the cultural differences which led to an unpredicted over-weighting of the perceived loss of “honor” within Egypt’s decision- making process. Through my analysis of the available evidence I conclude that it was not the cultural differences which resulted in a misinterpretation of

⁹ File 1159: Declassified Department of State Telegram, Subject: Jarring’s Comparison of UAR and Israeli Papers; Jan. 19, 1971; National Security Council Institutional Files; National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

¹⁰ File 2390: Declassified Department of State Telegram; Apr. 9, 1971; National Security Council Institutional Files; National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

¹¹ File 134: Memorandum of Conversation; Mahmoud Fawzi and Henry Kissinger; May 29, 1969; White House Central Files, Henry A. Kissinger Files; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.

¹² File 2650: Declassified US Intelligence Cairo, Department of State Telegram Subject: Egypt after Nasser; Nov. 14; 1970; National Security Council Institutional Files; National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

Egyptian objectives. It was the Egyptian “honor” and “dignity” attached the international boundary norms which served as a framing device within Egyptian decision-making. In Sadat’s Speech on January 4th 1971 he clearly states that “honor and dignity has its price and the UAR will fight whatever the cost for the sake of its honor and dignity.”¹³ To the Egyptians the unusual importance placed upon the sanctity of borders was viewed as a norm.

Sadat was straightforward in his objectives in the period following the defeat of June 1967. In his speech he explains “the Arab sense of honor is deeply involved in the possession of land”¹⁴. Sadat justifies the October War nine months in advance telling by telling Egypt “the confrontation is for the sake of land, honor, freedom, dignity and peace”.¹⁵ It is evident from US Intelligence reports and Sadat’s January 4th speech that honor and dignity played a major role in influencing the decisions of Egyptian government. This type of language was assumed by Israeli authorities to be influencing decision-making at some level however still dominated by the assumed success of deterrence. If the Israelis returned all occupied Egyptian territory it is likely that Egyptian honor would be restored without war. This, however, was not the case and Egypt needed to fight not only in an attempt to reclaim its land but also to reclaim the honor lost in the humiliating June 1967 defeat and the occupation of its lawful territory that followed.

The failure of ripeness

Ripeness is the situation in which conflicting parties are prepared for peace accords. According to Zartman (2003), ripeness occurs under the conditions of a “mutually hurting” stalemate. In the midst of the War of Attrition Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi stated “that both Israel and UAR needed peace because they have been “bled white” by the arms race”, this illustrates his awareness to what he believed to be mutually

hurting conditions.¹⁶ There was not a precise time in which both Israel and Egypt were prepared to make the concessions necessary for peacemaking. It is my belief that the conditions following the June 1967 war were not “hurting” for the Israelis and they were in fact better off keeping the status quo. Through maintenance of the status quo Israel believed they would ensure the success of deterrence. The contrasting positions of Israel and Egypt during this period negate any potential for a period “ripe for peace”.

If the position of Egypt was fully realized by Israel and other international influences it is possible that the October 1973 war could have been prevented. In late 1970 and early 1971 after a prolonged stalemate in the negotiation process Egypt began to show signs of compromise. In February 1971 Sadat unveiled a more moderate plan from which he expected to gain applause and encouragement from the United States, this was not the case. “Sadat was concerned that there had been no USG reaction to his proposal for partial withdrawal and reopening of the Suez Canal”.¹⁷ Sadat’s concern was justified and even the State Department later recognized that “Sadat was the first Egyptian or perhaps even Arab in 20 years who had said he would sign peace agreement with Israel, thus eliminating contention that Israel’s presence in the area was wrong. This opportunity is not to be lost”.¹⁸ Unfortunately the opportunity was lost and the unanswered concessions made by the Egyptians perpetuated their frustration with the negotiation process and further damaged their honor. In a US Intelligence telegram sent to The US Department of State the Agent in Cairo reports that “the sense of frustration and despair among Egyptians is greater even than what I found here in the aftermath of the June War”.¹⁹ The only conclusion drawn from negotiations was that both Egypt and Israel preferred land without peace to peace without land. The United States missed the opportunity to seize the Egyptian willingness to negotiate. The Israelis failed to

¹³ File 1159: Declassified US Intelligence Cairo, Department of State Telegram Subject: Sadat Speech on Jan. 4; Jan. 5, 1971; National Security Council Institutional Files; National Archives Building, College Park, MD. p.1.

¹⁴ File 1159: Declassified US Intelligence Cairo, Department of State Telegram Subject: Sadat Speech on Jan. 4; Jan. 5, 1971; National Security Council Institutional Files; National Archives Building, College Park, MD. p.3.

¹⁵ File 1166: Declassified AS- Sadat Addresses Nation on Middle East Situation, Direct Translation of live speech; Jan. 13, 1972; National Security Council Institutional Files; National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

¹⁶ File 134: Declassified Memorandum of Conversation; Mahmoud Fawzi and Henry Kissinger; May 29, 1969; White House Central Files, Henry A. Kissinger Files; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.

¹⁷ File 637: Declassified US Intelligence Cairo, Department of State Telegram; Feb. 8, 1971; National Security Council Institutional Files; National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

¹⁸ File 2390: Declassified Department of State Telegram; Subject: Israeli Settlement; April 4, 1971; White House Central Files, National Archives Building, Washington, DC.

¹⁹ File 1166: Declassified Department of State Telegram, US Intelligence Cairo; January 7, 1972; National Security Council Institutional Files; National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

make a move during periods such as that leading up to the October 1973 War when the Egyptians “clearly passed responsibility back to Israel”.²⁰ All opportunities to seize a period of ripeness, if ripeness existed, were lost by the Egyptians, the Israelis, and the Americans. The October war occurred because of Arab frustration with the failure of negotiations to produce any sort of relief to the Egyptian feelings of diminishing honor and dignity in the wake of violation and occupation of Egyptian territory.

The failure of deterrence

In October of 1973 Deterrence failed, contradicting almost everyone’s expectations. An examination of this and other situations of unexpected deterrence failure indicated that the calculus of initiators depends on factors other than those identified by deterrence (Stein, 1989). Deterrence failed because it was not the primary framing device in the decision-making model used by Egyptian decision makers. It was the importance of territorial integrity which put a greater value on the losses that were incurred by Egypt in the June 1967 War. The violation of Egypt’s territorial integrity was a blow to Egyptian honor and legitimacy as a state. This feeling of excessive losses both physical and mental translated into an unpredicted overweighting effect associated with Egyptian territorial integrity. Intelligence agencies were aware of Egypt’s plan to attack Israel by the spring of 1973, but reports that the Egyptians expected to act in the near future were dismissed because the Israelis did not think they would attack given the Egyptian military inferiority and the assumption that deterrence would in fact hold (Parker, 2001) . Following their humiliating defeat in the June 1967 Six Day War Egyptians were operating in the realm of losses. They had physically lost a large portion of their land and with it a portion of their honor and dignity. After suffering losses, political leaders have a tendency not to accommodate to those losses but instead to take excessive risks to recover them (Levy, 1997). In his subsequent decision-making research Amos Tversky found that when people are made to feel ignorant or incompetent, as the Egyptians in their inability to defend their land and honor, they prefer risk to uncertainty (Tversky, 1995). The Egyptians were frustrated with the uncertainty of the status quo and the failure of diplomacy to produce satisfactory results. This frustration led Egyptian decision makers to increasingly “risky” decisions and eventually war. Egyptian decision makers were no longer concerned with defeating the Israeli army because they knew this was not possible. In a state Department

²⁰ File 637: Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger From: Harold H. Saunders; UAR Response to Jarring Memo; Feb. 2, 1971; National Security Council Institutional Files; National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

Memorandum of Conversation Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan is quoted as saying that “Egypt realized that if it tried to cross the canal, it would be defeated”.²¹ They recognized Israeli superiority but still sought to reclaim any honor possible through any and all means including a war they knew they would lose. To Sadat inaction meant no reclamation of honor and continued adversity in both the economic and political arenas. Also included in the Egyptian decision to violate deterrence was the estimate of the international consequences of an attack by the Egyptians. The Egyptians knew that through violating deterrence they would attract international attention and potentially initiate further great power intervention. By violating deterrence the international community would be forced to step in to prevent a massacre. It is clear that there was a conscious manipulation of great power intervention by Egyptian decision makers. Even with an intervention by a great power Egypt would have broken the status quo, reclaimed a portion of its honor, and regained some level of legitimacy as a state.

Analysis

Prospect theory itself is not flawed in its application to decision-making within international relations. It is the variability of the framing devices governing a nation’s decision-making process which complicates the predictive characteristics of prospect theory. There are various other factors which may affect the reference point from which decisions are made.

The October war demonstrates that deterrence is not necessarily the primary decision framing device in war time decision making. There are many other factors that must be considered when looking at a nation’s decision to attack. The Egyptian decision-making process was governed by the high value placed on the importance of international boundary norms and territorial integrity. To the Egyptians territorial integrity holds great importance because of the honor, dignity, and legitimacy associated with it. The international community did not understand the position of Egypt and they failed to account for the unusually high weight placed by Egyptian decision makers on territorial integrity. If the international community fully understood that Egypt would attack to defend its honor without regard to the fact that Israel possessed military superiority then less leverage would have been granted to Israel within the negotiation process. There would have been no incentive for Israel hold the status quo if they knew Egypt would attack.

²¹ File 1166: Declassified Department of State Telegram, Secretary Rogers- Dayan Meeting Feb 7; Feb. 9, 1972; National Security Council Institutional Files; National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

Ripeness, if at anytime it existed, was not taken advantage of. Peace-making was not possible because there was not a period in the negotiation process in which both sides viewed the situation as "ripe". If there was a time that held potential for ripeness it was obscured by the false belief held by the Israelis and the Americans that deterrence would hold and the Egyptians would not attack. Understanding the decision framing processes of a nation within war time decision-making is critical if negotiations and peacemaking efforts are to be successful. Even if ripeness could exist it is possible that a misunderstanding of the decision-making processes by a given nation could prevent manifestation of a situation ripe for peace.

Conclusion

International boundary norms were the most important reference defining features of the Egyptian decision-making process. If in the period leading up to the October war there was a period of "ripeness" it was lost as a result of the incorrect overweighting of deterrence within the war-time decision making process. A better understanding of the various decision framing devices used by nations would potentially lead to a more accurate and predictive approach to recognizing periods of potential ripeness.

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